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ABSTRACT—The U.S. Constitution enshrines the jury in a sacred space 
within the American judicial system. Yet there are troubling signs that, 
notwithstanding their best efforts, jurors struggle to fulfill their duties. In 
particular, substantial empirical research indicates that jurors struggle to 
understand and, consequently, to apply the instructions given to them by the 
judge just prior to deliberations. Various mechanisms have been proposed—
and in some cases adopted—to improve jurors’ comprehension of 
instructions and the quality of the deliberations that follow. Among these are 
rewriting jury instructions in “plain English,” permitting jurors to take notes 
and ask questions of witnesses, providing jurors with interim and preliminary 
instructions, providing written copies of jury instructions, and adopting a 
bifurcated trial structure. And, indeed, many of these proposals are backed 
by empirical research suggesting that they improve juror decision-making. 
Yet none have proven to be a panacea, and much room remains for 
improvement. This Note builds on previous legal scholarship analogizing 
jurors to learners and proposes a novel set of procedural reforms based on 
educational research—particularly the theory of Direct Instruction—that 
would further improve juror comprehension and decision-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following: there is an ongoing civil trial—say, a state law 
class action brought by individuals who allege injuries resulting from the 
defendants’ misrepresentations regarding the safety of vaping products. The 
stakes are immense for both parties. The defendants have “bet the company” 
and will be driven out of business if they lose. Likewise, many plaintiffs are 
gravely injured and face medical bankruptcy absent a favorable verdict. The 
trial is exceedingly complex, involving more than one hundred hours of 
testimony. When the time finally arrives for deliberations, the judge spends 
several hours instructing the jurors on all elements of the plaintiff’s fraud 
claims. Yet the judge’s byzantine instructions leave the jurors deeply—
though silently—confused. Too sheepish to ask for clarification, they soon 
retreat into deliberations. Within an hour, the jurors return their verdict. The 
defendants have prevailed, and the injured plaintiffs face financial ruin. 
The plaintiffs’ attorneys interview several jurors post-verdict, soon 
discovering that the jurors applied a contributory negligence concept in 
reaching their verdict. In other words, notwithstanding their misgivings 
about the defendants’ behavior, the jurors decided that the plaintiffs 
“accepted the risk” in using vaping products. Naturally, this reasoning 
reflects the jurors’ common sense. Yet it also reflects their confusion. For, 
you see, this jurisdiction rejects contributory negligence defenses. Thus, the 
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jurors have, albeit inadvertently, thrown out the judge’s carefully crafted 
instructions in favor of gut instinct. Does this scenario seem far-fetched? 
Sadly, it is far more likely than one might imagine. 
The U.S. Constitution enshrines the jury in a sacred space within the 
American judicial system.1 Jurors are asked to fairly apply legal principles 
to reach verdicts that determine the rights, responsibilities, and freedoms of 
the parties in front of the court. All indications suggest that jurors strive in 
good faith to carry out this solemn duty.2 Yet, notwithstanding their best 
efforts, there are also signs that jurors at times struggle with this task. Judges’ 
instructions are often difficult to understand and so abstract as to bear little 
relationship to the dispute in front of the court.3 And empirical research 
suggests that jurors’ difficulties in understanding instructions can lead to 
incorrect verdicts, even in matters as serious as capital sentencing.4 
Scholars have suggested and courts have attempted numerous reforms, 
including providing preliminary instructions; providing written instructions; 
using special verdicts and interrogatories; rewriting instructions into easier-
to-understand “plain English”; bifurcating complex trials into smaller, more 
focused proceedings; and permitting jurors to ask questions and take notes 
during the trial.5 And research suggests that these reforms do help jurors 
comprehend the law they are asked to apply.6 But none of these reforms has 
proven to be a panacea, and there remains considerable room for 
improvement. 
This Note argues that jurors—laypeople—are best understood as novice 
legal learners who bear substantial similarity to students in other 
environments. Accordingly, this Note suggests a novel set of procedural 
reforms that, although anchored in existing trial mechanisms, also 
 
 1 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. Although the Supreme Court has applied the Sixth Amendment’s 
criminal-jury requirement to the states through its “selective incorporation” doctrine, it has not yet done 
so with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil cases. See generally F. Andrew Hessick & 
Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 ALA. L. REV. 163 (2019) (discussing the 
selective-incorporation doctrine and the extent to which it has been used to apply various provisions of 
the Bill of Rights to the states). 
 2 See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to 
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 98 (1988) (“[A] typical jury makes a good faith effort to use its 
instructions for the purpose intended, that is, to reach a verdict according to the law.”). 
 3 Jay E. Grenig, The Civil Jury in America: Improving the Jury’s Understanding of a Case, 24 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 93, 99 (2000) (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems 
and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 731, 732 (1981)). 
 4 See infra Sections I.A.1–I.A.3. 
 5 See infra Part II. 
 6 See infra Part II. 
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incorporate educational principles in order to improve juror comprehension 
of legal principles. 
Educational or “learning theories” are bodies of scholarly work that 
“describe views regarding how one acquires knowledge and creates 
connections among the items of information encountered in the world.”7 
There are nearly as many educational theories as there are stars in the sky,8 
and although these theories rarely provide “exact pedagogical strategies or 
instructional methods,”9 they nevertheless communicate key principles that 
have significant instructional implications.10 This Note argues that the 
principles of one particular educational theory—that of “direct” or 
“systematic” instruction—are especially helpful for jurors faced with the 
daunting task of applying unfamiliar legal doctrines to reach a fair verdict. It 
then extrapolates from Direct Instruction principles to propose modifications 
to the jury-instruction and deliberation processes that would empower jurors 
to more easily carry out this vital task. 
Part I overviews the existing research on juror comprehension and 
establishes the grave consequences of jurors’ failures to comprehend 
instructions. Part II reviews existing reforms aimed at improving juror 
comprehension and assesses their strengths and limitations. Part III proposes 
novel reforms to jury-trial procedures that are rooted in the principles of 
Direct Instruction and which seek to further improve juror comprehension. 
It then addresses likely points of opposition and discusses various testing 
mechanisms by which the validity of the proposal might be established. This 
Note briefly concludes by illustrating the application of this proposal in a 
hypothetical products liability case. 
I. JUROR COMPREHENSION AND APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS 
This Part overviews the existing literature regarding juror 
comprehension, which establishes that jurors often fail to comprehend 
judicial instructions. Next, it discusses potential contributing factors to juror 
confusion. It then overviews literature suggesting that juror confusion leads 
to incorrect and, in some cases, potentially catastrophic results. It establishes 
that juror confusion is pervasive in both civil and criminal contexts, 
 
 7 Kelley Buchheister, Learning Theories, in 3 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH, MEASUREMENT, AND EVALUATION 961 (Bruce B. Frey ed., 2018). 
 8 A bit of hyperbole, of course, but there are dozens (or more) of educational theories that have 
garnered significant attention. For a representative sample, see Paul Stevens-Fulbrook, 15 Learning 
Theories in Education (A Complete Summary), TEACHEROFSCI.COM (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://teacherofsci.com/learning-theories-in-education/ [https://perma.cc/H27A-8PAQ]. 
 9 Buchheister, supra note 7, at 961. 
 10 Id. 
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including in applying burdens of proof and, more tragically, in capital 
sentencing cases. Finally, this Part discusses more recent research by 
Professor Shari Diamond and her coauthors that, although affirming the 
general conclusion that jurors struggle to comprehend judicial instructions, 
indicates that juror comprehension may be somewhat better than previously 
thought. 
A. Jurors’ Limited Instruction Comprehension 
Over the past several decades, researchers have examined the extent to 
which jurors comprehend—or fail to comprehend—their instructions.11 In 
one study, researchers tested juror comprehension by asking jurors to 
paraphrase essential terms from a set of pattern instructions.12 The overall 
accuracy rate was 54%.13 Another study found comprehension rates ranging 
from 51% to 65%, depending upon the complexity of the case.14 A 2000 
study by Professors Mona Lynch and Craig Haney found an average 
accuracy rate of 42% when using mock jurors in a hypothetical capital 
sentencing case.15 Other studies have found comprehension rates ranging 
from around 30% on the low end to around 70% in the highest estimates.16 
One study on the insanity defense found comprehension levels as low as 
15%.17 
 
 11 Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury 
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2012). 
 12 Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A 
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1313 (1979). This study parsed 
legal instructions into discrete units of meaning (e.g., “you must follow the law”), which the researchers 
dubbed “variables,” and assessed juror ability to paraphrase the essential variables of the instruction. 
Paraphrasing of each variable was deemed “correct,” “correct by inference,” “wrong,” or “omitted.” Id. 
at 1314. 
 13 Id. at 1316. 
 14 Amiram Elwork, James J. Alfini & Bruce D. Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 
65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1982). 
 15 Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, 
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 486 (2009) [hereinafter Lynch & 
Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation]. 
 16 See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to 
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153, 179–180 (1982) (finding 
correct response rates of up to 70.4% on multiple-choice questions testing comprehension of concepts 
such as reasonable doubt); Richard L. Wiener, Christine C. Pritchard & Minda Weston, 
Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 455, 
460 (1995) (finding 29% comprehension of the reasonable-doubt instruction using a multiple-choice 
comprehension inventory in a simulated capital sentencing case where study participants received model 
instructions revised according to psycholinguistic principles). 
 17 James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 519 (1991) (finding 14.9% of participants correctly recalled a specific 
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Although the law generally assumes complete or near-complete juror 
comprehension of instructions,18 this assumption conflicts with the empirical 
research described above. Instead, this research suggests that jurors develop, 
at best, an incomplete understanding of the law after receiving instructions 
from the judge. Reported levels of postinstruction comprehension are often 
quite low—no better than chance—and studies yield mixed results regarding 
whether jury instructions improve understanding of the law at all.19 Although 
some studies demonstrate modest postinstruction improvement in jurors’ 
understanding of the law, others have found that instructed jurors possess no 
greater understanding of the law than noninstructed controls.20 In particular, 
one study of Michigan jurors found that instructions improved jurors’ 
understanding of procedural rules, but not definitions of crimes.21 
B. Contributing Factors 
There are various reasons why jurors might fail to comprehend 
instructions. Some scholars suggest jurors struggle to comprehend 
instructions because the instructions include legal jargon which carries either 
no meaning for laypersons or which carries lay meaning different from its 
legal meaning.22 Indeed, one judge studied jurors’ comprehension of 
Georgia’s “proximate cause” instructions and found that, although more than 
half the jurors realized the concept was significant, just over 20% correctly 
understood the instruction.23 As the judge concluded, “A trial judge who 
 
element of the insanity defense under the M’Naghten standard); see also Dan Simon, More Problems 
with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 
174 n.37 (2012) (citing Ogloff and other studies regarding jury-instruction comprehension levels). 
 18 Simon, supra note 17, at 174–75. This is presumably because the fairness of any particular verdict 
is predicated on the jury having correctly applied—and, necessarily, having understood—the pertinent 
law. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324–25 n.9 (1985) (“[W]e must assume that juries for the 
most part understand and faithfully follow instructions.” (quoting R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF 
HARMLESS ERROR 7374 (1970))). For a detailed analysis of this assumption, see generally Judith L. 
Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors 
Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 164 (2004). 
 19 Simon, supra note 17, at 175. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law 
in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 547 (1992). 
 22 See e.g., Charles M. Cork, III, A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1, 9 
(2002) (“Empirical researchers have consistently reported a problem with the use of legal jargonterms 
of legal art that carry no intuitive meaning to lay jurors or a lay meaning different from the legally correct 
meaning.”). 
 23 Charles B. Mikell, Jury Instructions and Proximate Cause: An Uncertain Trumpet in Georgia, 
27 GA. ST. BAR J. 60, 62–63 (1990). 
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reads a jury this instruction might just as well read a poem in Mandarin 
Chinese. It probably makes no difference in the outcome of [the] case . . . .”24 
Another possible culprit is over-generality in jury instructions. There 
are several possible reasons why overly general instructions might cause 
problems with juror comprehension. First, language drafted for universal 
applicability is invariably harder for jurors to understand because it remains 
at a confusing level of abstraction.25 Second, generalized instructions map 
poorly onto the facts of specific cases. Thus, jurors struggle to apply 
unfamiliar legal content which lacks any clear connection to the factual 
contexts they face in the courtroom.26 Third, the intentionally broad scope of 
generalized instructions likely causes jurors to consider less relevant or 
irrelevant information in their deliberations27—for instance, affirmative 
defenses inapplicable to the case at hand. 
The length and complex structure of jury instructions also pose 
difficulties for jurors.28 Some courts have recognized that the total length of 
jury instructions tends to adversely impact jurors’ comprehension.29 
Moreover, the charge provided to the jury is often assembled from a 
collection of shorter instructions.30 The piecemeal assembling of instructions 
tends to confuse jurors, and remedying that confusion might prove difficult 
or impossible unless jurors take the time to ask clarifying questions.31 
Likewise, certain instructions, when assembled together, can become 
contextually unclear, even if they are otherwise accurate statements of the 
law.32 
Juror comprehension can also be limited by factors outside the 
instructions themselves. For instance, factors such as jurors’ educational 
level,33 their preexisting notions of how the legal system functions,34 and the 
 
 24 Id. at 64 (footnote omitted). 
 25 Cork, supra note 22, at 11. 
 26 Id. at 11–12. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 12. 
 29 Id. at 13 (noting that jury instructions in Georgia tend to be excessively long). 
 30 Id. at 14. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 15; see also Gunn v. Dep’t of Transp., 476 S.E.2d 46, 47–49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing 
a jury verdict where the juxtaposition of two otherwise valid instructions created internal inconsistencies 
in the jury instructions). 
 33 See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury 
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 617 (1997). 
 34 Id. at 618–19. 
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inherent complexity of a case35 could all contribute to difficulties with 
comprehension. Furthermore, various procedural limitations might keep 
jurors from reaching optimum levels of comprehension, such as prohibitions 
against jurors asking questions of witnesses or discussing the evidence prior 
to the beginning of deliberations.36 
C. Consequences of Jurors’ Struggles to Comprehend 
In most cases, jurors make a good-faith effort to use the instructions 
provided.37 However, they are hobbled by their struggles to comprehend the 
instructions,38 which leave them uncertain as to how to apply the law to the 
facts.39 This in turn may encourage jurors to decide the case on a gut sense 
of who they think should win without regard for the facts and the law.40 
Significant empirical research on both criminal and civil jury instructions 
supports the conclusion that jurors incorrectly apply the law as a result of 
their difficulty comprehending instructions, at times with serious 
consequences. 
1. Civil Cases 
Jurors struggle to piece together the instructions in complex civil cases, 
particularly those including multiple claims.41 In one study, Professor 
Diamond and her coauthors reviewed recordings of multiple jury 
deliberations from real cases.42 In one personal injury case, the authors found 
that jurors struggled to apply instructions when the case involved multiple 
tort claims, including a contingent claim of negligent supervision.43 There, 
finding the defendant employer liable for negligent supervision would 
necessarily have required finding one of the defendant employees liable for 
one of the other tort claims.44 This requirement wasn’t stated explicitly in the 
instructions, and the jurors only cleared up their confusion about the 
contingent claim after discussing the topic at length and submitting a 
 
 35 Jerry J. Fang, Note, 12 Confused Men: Using Flowchart Verdict Sheets to Mitigate Inconsistent 
Civil Verdicts, 64 DUKE L.J. 287, 306 (2014) (citing Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 61617). 
 36 William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 120. 
 37 Steele & Thornburg, supra note 2, at 98. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Cork, supra note 22, at 6. 
 40 Id. at 6–7. 
 41 Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 1565–66. 
 42 See id. at 1546–47. The recorded, authentic deliberations were part of the larger Arizona Jury 
Project. Id. 
 43 Id. at 1566. 
 44 Id. 
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question to the judge.45 Absent this clarification, the jury might well have 
tried to find the employer liable for negligent supervision even without 
finding that one of its employees had committed the predicate tort. 
In other instances, a few confused jurors attempted to entirely omit 
negligence as a requirement to award damages in tort cases.46 That is to say, 
the jurors, believing in each case that the plaintiff had suffered damages, 
wished to find the defendant liable even absent the requisite finding of 
negligence.47 Ultimately, these cases were resolved correctly when other 
jurors pointed out that the instructions required negligence as a predicate to 
liability. But it is still unsettling that at least some members of the jury were 
initially willing to bypass an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Even 
worse, Professor Diamond’s study revealed that other more serious errors 
remained uncorrected. 
Among the more serious errors identified was the tendency to conflate 
issues of liability and damages in comparative fault cases.48 Jurors were 
instructed to determine first the defendant’s liability, then total damages, 
then what percentage of fault was attributable to the plaintiff.49 Instead, jurors 
sometimes factored in the degree of comparative fault when calculating 
damages. In other words, some juries determined up front how much money 
they wished to award to the plaintiff and then adjusted damages upward to 
ensure that the plaintiff would receive that amount regardless of comparative 
fault.50 Ultimately, Professor Diamond and her coauthors concluded that 
jurors frequently misapplied the law in comparative fault cases, that most of 
their errors were not corrected, and that in many cases these uncorrected 
errors affected the amount of damages awarded.51 Thus, whether resulting 
from problems with comprehension or reluctance to apply the law as written, 
current jury instructions in comparative fault cases fail to fully separate 
jurors’ consideration of liability and damages.52 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 156768. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 1569. 
 52 Id. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the authors’ overall conclusions, approximately 79% 
of juror comments during deliberations accurately reflected the judge’s instructions, and only 9% 
represented uncorrected errors. Id. at 1594. But this only suggests that, even when jurors can accurately 
state or apply the judges’ instructions, their lack of comprehension still causes them to misapply the law 
in complex civil cases. 
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2. Burden-of-Proof Instructions 
One particularly dangerous opportunity for juror error lies in applying 
the burden of proof in criminal cases. A 1976 mock juror study by Judge 
David Strawn and Professor Raymond Buchanan concluded that only 50% 
of instructed study participants comprehended the reasonable doubt standard 
applicable in criminal cases.53 Another study in 1990 compared the 
comprehension of “reasonable doubt” for individuals who had served as 
jurors to that of individuals who had been called but were not selected for 
jury service.54 Of the instructed individuals—that is, those who had actually 
served as jurors—only approximately 25% correctly determined that 
reasonable doubt is a higher threshold than “any doubt, no matter how 
slight.”55 Worse, instructions on reasonable doubt even appeared to increase 
confusion on one area—more instructed than noninstructed jurors believed 
that reasonable doubt could only be based on the evidence, not on inferences 
drawn from the evidence.56 These findings raise serious due process 
concerns.57 After all, “[i]f jurors fail to understand the law, there is no way 
to be certain that the reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied.”58 
Empirical research further suggests that jurors’ struggles to apply the 
correct burden of proof might go beyond the realm of reasonable doubt. A 
1985 study tested juror application of various burdens of proof, including 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond 
a reasonable doubt.59 The researchers provided study participants with legal 
definitions of the various burdens of proof—derived from pattern jury 
instructions—as well as quantified definitions (51%, 71%, and 91% for 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond 
a reasonable doubt, respectively).60 
 
 53 David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 
478, 481 (1976). 
 54 Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? 
Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 409–
10 (1990). 
 55 Id. at 414. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (“The evidence upon which a jury is 
justified in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion 
of all reasonable doubt.”). 
 58 John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid Criminal Juror 
Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2002). 
 59 Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 162–63 (1985). 
 60 Id. at 163. 
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Study participants provided with quantified definitions of the burden of 
proof returned fewer verdicts for the plaintiff as the burden of proof 
increased, showing that the quantified definitions produced the intended 
legal effect.61 In contrast, the unquantified burden-of-proof definitions taken 
from pattern jury instructions produced no significant effect on the rate of 
verdicts returned in favor of the plaintiff.62 In fact, study participants 
receiving the pattern-instruction definition of reasonable doubt actually 
returned more verdicts in favor of the plaintiff (43%) than those receiving 
the preponderance of the evidence definition (31%).63 Moreover, even when 
quantified definitions of the burden of proof were provided, there was only 
an insignificant difference in the number of verdicts returned for the plaintiff 
between the clear and convincing and preponderance standards.64 Given the 
constitutional mandate that criminal defendants be convicted only when 
jurors are convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,65 
jurors’ apparent inability to comprehend and delineate between various 
standards of proof is quite troubling. 
3. Capital Sentencing 
Even more disturbing than the possibility that criminal defendants 
might be convicted using a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the possibility that jurors might misapply instructions in capital 
sentencing cases. In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam 
opinion, concluded that existing state death-sentencing schemes violated the 
Eighth Amendment because they allowed jurors “untrammeled discretion”66 
that could lead to the “arbitrary and discriminatory” imposition of the death 
 
 61 Id. at 164–65. Participants returned pro-plaintiff verdicts at rates of 66% for the preponderance of 
the evidence standard, 52% for the clear and convincing evidence standard, and 31% for the reasonable 
doubt standard. Id. 
 62 Id. at 164. Participants returned pro-plaintiff verdicts at rates of 31% for the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, 38% for the clear and convincing evidence standard, and 43% for the reasonable doubt 
standard. Id. However, a 1996 mock juror study by Professors Irwin Horowitz and Laird Kirkpatrick 
found that unquantified reasonable doubt definitions that included “firmly convinced” language tended 
to produce verdicts more in accord with the evidence. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A 
Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt 
Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 667 (1996) (“It appears that only the ‘firmly 
convinced’ instructions provided jurors with the guidance or stimulus to reach appropriate verdicts in 
both the weak and strong case.”). 
 63 Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 59, at 164. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (“The evidence upon which a jury is justified in 
returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion of all 
reasonable doubt.”). 
 66 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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penalty.67 For a period of time, this holding led to a blanket prohibition on 
the imposition and carrying out of death sentences in the United States.68 
Many states responded by revising their capital sentencing instructions in an 
attempt to reduce the “unbridled discretion” of the jury.69 When these revised 
instructions were later challenged, the Court concluded in Gregg v. Georgia 
that capital sentencing is not inherently unconstitutional, and that jury 
discretion is permissible so long as it is properly guided.70 Jurors must now 
adhere to this principle of “guided discretion” in all capital cases. 71 Yet, there 
are troubling signs that jurors struggle to comprehend their instructions in 
this most precarious area of law. 
A series of studies by Professors Haney and Lynch tested jury-eligible 
Californians’ comprehension of the state’s capital sentencing instructions.72 
Despite hearing the instructions repeatedly, the study participants struggled 
to define the terms “aggravation” and “mitigation,” and only 8% could 
provide legally correct definitions of both.73 Worse still, two of the mitigating 
factors were misinterpreted as aggravating factors by 23% and 25% of the 
study participants, respectively,74 and only half understood that a death 
verdict should not be issued when mitigating factors outweighed aggravating 
factors in a given case.75 Additionally, 41% incorrectly believed that when 
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating ones the death penalty was 
mandatory.76 
Admittedly, these studies involved jury-eligible adults and 
undergraduate students, not actual jurors.77 However, researchers at the 
Capital Jury Project obtained similar findings by interviewing more than 
 
 67 Id. at 243. 
 68 Id. at 239–40. This prohibition ended with the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 (1976). 
 69 Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation, supra note 15, at 481. 
 70 428 U.S. at 206–07. 
 71 Simon, supra note 17, at 181. 
 72 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of 
California’s Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 418 (1994) [hereinafter Haney 
& Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death]. 
 73 Id. at 421. 
 74 Id. at 424. 
 75 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional 
Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 575, 581–82 (1997) 
[hereinafter Haney & Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death]. 
 76 Id. at 582. 
 77 See Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation, supra note 15, at 483 (jury-eligible adults); Haney 
& Lynch, Clarifying Life & Death, supra note 75, at 577 (same); Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life 
& Death, supra note 72, at 418 (undergraduates). 
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1,200 jurors who had served on capital cases. Nearly half of the interviewed 
jurors mistakenly believed that the death sentence was mandatory under 
certain circumstances.78 Other jurors felt that the law contemplated additional 
aggravating factors which, although plausible, were not included in the 
instructions.79 
Moreover, additional studies reveal significant racial disparities in the 
application of the death sentence in capital cases and suggest that these 
patterns might be tied to juror comprehension. For example, a study by 
Professor David Baldus examined verdicts in 2,484 homicide cases decided 
in Georgia between 1973 and 1979 and found that although white defendants 
were sentenced to death only 8% of the time for killing white victims, Black 
defendants convicted of killing white victims were sentenced to death 21% 
of the time.80 Similar disparities have been observed in other jurisdictions, 
including Philadelphia, Maryland, and New Jersey.81 In 2000, Professors 
Lynch and Haney conducted a study of jury-eligible adults and tied such 
racial disparities to juror comprehension, finding that the study participants 
who struggled most to comprehend death penalty instructions also sentenced 
Black defendants to death at higher rates than white defendants.82 These 
findings suggest that considerable doubt remains as to whether even revised 
capital sentencing instructions have remedied the constitutional issues 
presented in Furman. Moreover, these findings suggest a grave human toll 
as a result of juror miscomprehension. Any wrongful capital sentence is 
irreversible once carried out, and one especially horrifying study by 
Professor Samuel Gross and his coauthors found that as many as 4.1% of 
capital sentences might result from false convictions.83 
4. Cause for Hope 
Despite the research described above, the news is not all bad. Although 
uncorrected juror errors appeared to influence some of the verdicts in 
 
 78 Simon, supra note 17, at 183. 
 79 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital 
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1993). 
 80 DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 45, 315, 328 (1990). 
 81 See Simon, supra note 17, at 184–85 n.103. 
 82 Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided 
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 354–55 (2000). The 
authors drew no firm conclusions on what drove this pattern but found it “theoretically consistent with 
much social psychological writing about the mechanics of ‘aversive’ or ‘subtle’ racism.” Id. at 353. 
 83 Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu & Edward H. Kennedy, Rate of False Conviction of 
Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7230, 7234 (2014). 
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Professor Diamond’s Arizona Jury Project study,84 the majority of jurors’ 
comments about the instructions were correct.85 This reflected a significantly 
higher level of juror comprehension than many previous studies observed, 
and Professor Diamond has suggested that this higher level of 
comprehension might come as a result of jurors having the opportunity to 
correct each other’s errors during deliberations.86 Moreover, the 
comprehension measures used in studies assessing juror comprehension 
have varied significantly. Some studies have used paraphrase tests, which 
challenge jurors to restate legal instructions in their own words.87 Logically, 
paraphrase tests are generally more challenging than simpler measures such 
as multiple-choice questionnaires. Thus, it might well be that the lower 
comprehension scores reflected in earlier studies are in part a product of the 
comprehension measures used. As a result, it is possible that Professor 
Diamond’s review of real jury deliberations more accurately reflects levels 
of juror comprehension in response to instructions, notwithstanding its 
variance from some of the earlier studies. In any event, it is clear that there 
is still room for significant improvements in juror comprehension. 
II. EXISTING APPROACHES TO IMPROVING JUROR INSTRUCTION 
COMPREHENSION 
Various reforms have been proposed to improve comprehension of jury 
instructions. This Part begins by reviewing perhaps the most well-researched 
jury-instruction reform—the redrafting of pattern jury instructions into 
“plain English.”88 It discusses the nature of plain English revisions, the extent 
to which research indicates that revised instructions improve juror 
comprehension, and the potential limitations and drawbacks of pattern-
instruction revisions. It then provides an overview of other comprehension-
oriented reforms that various jurisdictions have tested, including permitting 
juror note-taking; providing jurors with written copies of judicial 
instructions; utilizing special verdicts and special interrogatories; providing 
jurors with substantive preliminary and interim instructions; and bifurcating 
trials into separate phases based on distinct legal issues. It concludes that, 
 
 84 See Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 159596. 
 85 Specifically, 79% of the jurors’ comments accurately reflected the judges’ instructions, while only 
9% reflected uncorrected errors. Id. at 1594. 
 86 Id. at 1595. 
 87 See, e.g., Steele & Thornburg, supra note 2, at 90. 
 88 This term is heavily used in the literature on jury instructions and refers to rewriting jury 
instructions to be more reader-friendly. See infra Section II.A for a more detailed description of plain 
English revisions. 
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although these mechanisms can improve juror comprehension, further 
innovations are needed to surpass the limitations of these reforms. 
A. “Plain English” Revisions of Pattern Jury Instructions 
Perhaps the most well-tested jury reform aimed at improving juror 
comprehension is rewriting pattern jury instructions for greater clarity and 
readability.89 Several studies convincingly suggest that revising jury 
instructions into plain English promotes greater comprehension. For 
example, Professors Robert Charrow and Veda Charrow undertook a study 
in which they rewrote pattern jury instructions to reduce confusing terms and 
awkward linguistic constructions.90 Study participants achieved significantly 
higher levels of comprehension using these rewritten instructions, with some 
instructions providing as much as 93% improvement in comprehension.91 
In a second study, Professor Diamond and Professor Judith Levi 
experimented with rewriting the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions.92 They 
reduced common linguistic difficulties and clarified especially difficult legal 
concepts.93 Some study subjects received the pattern instructions while others 
received the revised instructions, and both groups were tested for 
comprehension.94 The subjects receiving revised instructions performed 
better on a nineteen-question test of comprehension, with these subjects 
responding with more correct and fewer incorrect responses compared to 
those receiving the pattern jury instructions.95 
A third study experimented with rewriting pattern instructions for 
hypothetical criminal trials involving charges of murder and burglary.96 The 
authors rewrote the instructions by eliminating uncommon words, redrafting 
instructions in the active voice, and replacing abstract words with more 
 
 89 Cronan, supra note 58, at 1235–36. 
 90 Charrow & Charrow, supra note 12, at 1311. 
 91 See id. at 1352. 
 92 Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing 
Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 226–28 (1996). 
 93 Id. at 227. For example, the original pattern instructions included the following language regarding 
aggravating factors: “Aggravating factors are reasons why the defendant should be sentenced to death.” 
The authors revised this to read: “In a criminal case such as this one, an ‘aggravating factor’ is any fact 
or condition or circumstance that, in your judgment, makes a sentence of death more appropriate for this 
defendant than a sentence of imprisonment.” Id. at 228. 
 94 Id. at 226. 
 95 Id. at 230. The total percentage of correct responses rose by an average of 15%, and the total 
percentage of incorrect responses decreased by an average of 15%. Id. 
 96 AMIRAM ELWORK, BRUCE D. SALES & JAMES J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
UNDERSTANDABLE 43–44 (1982). 
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concrete ones.97 Study subjects reviewed a video of a trial and then received 
either the pattern instructions or the rewritten ones.98 For subjects viewing 
the videotape of a murder trial, the second rewrite of the instructions yielded 
an 80% comprehension rate, up from 51% with the pattern instructions.99 
Similarly, subjects who viewed the videotape of a burglary trial achieved an 
80% comprehension rate, up from 65% using the pattern instructions.100 
Additional studies support the conclusion that rewriting pattern jury 
instructions can yield significant improvements in juror comprehension.101 
Furthermore, even authors who lack special training in linguistics have been 
able to significantly improve juror comprehension by rewriting jury 
instructions.102 Thus, rewriting pattern instructions shows considerable 
promise as a method to improve juror comprehension. Some states, most 
notably California, have even taken on formal efforts to revise their jury 
instructions for clarity.103 
However, rewriting pattern instructions is likely not a cure-all for cases 
of juror confusion. Although the existing studies reveal significant 
improvements in comprehension when using revised jury instructions, 
hurdles remain. For example, subjects in Professors Diamond and Levi’s 
study achieved higher levels of comprehension with the revised instructions, 
but they still answered 30% of the comprehension questions incorrectly.104 
Likewise, a study showing dramatic increases in comprehension when using 
revised jury instructions still found that when subjected to a paraphrasing 
test jurors incorrectly paraphrased the instructions the majority of the time.105 
Furthermore, revising jury instructions carries some risks.106 Long, complex 
jury instructions stem, in part, from trial court judges’ efforts to avoid 
 
 97 Id. at 168–80. 
 98 Id. at 43–44. 
 99 Id. at 45. 
 100 Id. at 46. 
 101 See, e.g., Severance & Loftus, supra note 16, at 190 (finding that jurors display only a 20.3% rate 
of comprehension errors when provided with revised instructions, compared to nearly 30% without 
revised instructions); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 2, at 90–91 (finding a 91% gain in comprehension 
with revised instructions). 
 102 Cronan, supra note 58, at 1238. 
 103 See id. at 1239; John Coleman, Russ K.E. Espinoza & Jennifer V. Coons, An Empirical 
Comparison of the Old and Revised Jury Instructions of California: Do Jurors Comprehend Legal Ease 
Better or Does Bias Still Exist?, OPEN ACCESS LIBR. J., Feb. 17, 2017, at 35 (describing efforts by 
Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, and California to rewrite their standard jury instructions). 
 104 Diamond & Levi, supra note 92, at 230. 
 105 Cronan, supra note 58, at 1238–39. 
 106 Id. at 1240. 
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reversal on appeal.107 Jury instructions often closely mirror the language of 
statutes and appellate opinions, and revising their language runs the risk of 
creating legal inaccuracies.108 Additionally, some research suggests that 
jurors tend to rely on existing mental schemas109 to assess the features of a 
crime or claim, and such preconceived notions might not be easily overcome 
by mere revision of pattern instructions.110 
B. Other Researched Approaches 
1. Juror Note-Taking 
Another relatively well-researched jury reform is allowing juror note-
taking during trials. As far back as 1960, the Judicial Conference Committee 
on the Operation of the Jury System recommended that 
trial jurors should, in the discretion of the trial judge, be permitted to take notes 
for use in their deliberations regarding the evidence presented to them and to 
take these notes with them when they retire for their deliberations. When 
permitted to be taken, [notes] should be treated as confidential between the juror 
making them and . . . fellow jurors.111 
Although the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on the propriety of 
juror note-taking, most appellate courts at both the state and federal levels 
leave juror note-taking within the discretion of the trial court judge.112 
The available empirical research suggests note-taking has either neutral 
or modest beneficial effects on juror comprehension. Studies from 1997113 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 The term “schema,” as used in educational research, refers to “knowledge structures” which 
“organize knowledge about specific stimulus domains and guide both the processing of new information 
and the retrieval of stored information.” Norbert M. Seel, Schema(s), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SCIENCES 
OF LEARNING 2933 (Norbert M. Seel ed., 2012). Think of a schema as one’s internal framework for 
organizing past experiences and internalizing new experiences in discrete areas of life. For example, one 
likely has a schema for the workplace—expectations about interpersonal relationships, about the physical 
work environment, about the roles of different employees, etc.—which serves as a framework that allows 
one to more easily understand and internalize new work-related experiences. 
 110 Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of 
Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381, 383–84 (1997). Professor Diamond dubs this tendency 
to rely on preexisting schemas the “consistency ceiling.” Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: 
Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48 AM. PSYCH. 423, 433 (1993). 
 111 Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 56768 (1997) (quoting Jud. Conf. Comm. on the Operation 
of the Jury Sys., The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 424 (1960)). 
 112 Id. at 568. 
 113 Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision 
Making, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 271 (1997). 
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and 1994114 suggest that juror note-taking creates modest improvement in 
juror recall of evidence. Furthermore, other studies indicate that juror note-
taking is well-received by jurors, judges, and attorneys,115 and that note-
taking might slightly increase juror satisfaction with the trial experience.116 
However, there are several common criticisms raised about the prospect 
of juror note-taking. First, some critics believe that note-taking will tend to 
distract jurors from the trial.117 Second, they believe that notetakers will tend 
to have an outsized influence in jury deliberations.118 Third, they believe that 
jurors will struggle to keep up with the pace of the trial while taking notes, 
thus causing them to rely on incomplete, inaccurate notes that poorly reflect 
the trial record.119 Fourth, they believe that jurors might take more notes early 
in the trial, causing them to favor the party that presents first—the 
prosecution in criminal trials and the plaintiff in civil trials.120 Finally, they 
suggest that juror note-taking might consume too much trial time.121 
However, these concerns are not confirmed by the existing research. 
2. Providing Jurors with Written Instructions 
Another commonly suggested reform to improve juror comprehension 
is providing jurors with a written copy of the final instructions. This practice 
is widely accepted—it is permitted by all federal circuits and the Supreme 
Court and is permitted or required by at least twenty-nine states.122 Although 
empirical research on this reform is limited, one study in the Second Circuit 
examined the effects of providing jurors with written instructions.123 In this 
study, four federal judges provided jurors in twelve analyzed trials with 
written instructions and evaluated the results.124 Of the twelve trials, the 
judges evaluated the written instructions as “very helpful” in six cases and at 
 
 114 David L. Rosenhan, Sara L. Eisner & Robert J. Robinson, Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall, 
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 58–60 (1994). 
 115 Penrod & Heuer, supra note 113, at 26667. 
 116 Id. at 267. 
 117 Id. (surveying cases throughout the 1900s and summarizing courts’ criticisms of juror note-
taking). 
 118 Id. at 267. 
 119 Id. at 268–69. 
 120 Id. at 26970. 
 121 Id. at 270. 
 122 TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY & SCIENCE § 39:10 (3d 
ed. Supp. 2019). 
 123 Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District 
Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 455–56 (1985). 
 124 Id. at 45455. 
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least “somewhat helpful” in the remaining six cases.125 The procedure also 
appeared to increase jurors’ comfort with the instructions; after receiving 
written instructions, jurors no longer asked the judges to reread portions of 
the charge.126 However, some attorneys surveyed for the study felt that this 
was a negative—they believed that jurors might be relying too much on the 
written instructions without seeking necessary clarification from the judge.127 
Still, courts could address this concern by explicitly informing jurors that 
they are free to ask questions about the instructions, notwithstanding their 
possession of a written copy of the instructions.128 Also, many study 
participants felt that the benefits of written instructions increased with the 
trial’s complexity.129 In reviewing this study and two others, then-Judge 
Michael Dann of the Superior Court of Arizona identified four clear 
advantages associated with the providing jurors with written instructions: (1) 
jurors were less confused by the charge; (2) jurors felt that written 
instructions aided deliberations; (3) jurors were left with fewer questions 
about the instructions; and (4) jurors felt more confident in their verdict.130 
Thus, this reform appears to carry several clear advantages and few 
disadvantages. Unfortunately, there is limited research examining 
specifically the extent to which written instructions improve juror 
comprehension. 
3. Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories 
Special verdicts and general verdicts with special interrogatories are 
two additional mechanisms which might improve juror comprehension of 
instructions. Both mechanisms are explicitly authorized by Rule 49 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.131 When a special verdict is used, the court 
submits various questions of fact for the jury to resolve.132 The jury resolves 
each factual matter presented to it without issuing a general verdict.133 The 
judge then applies the law to the jury’s factual findings in order to reach a 
verdict.134 To the extent that a jury’s factual findings are internally 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 45556. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and 
Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1259 (1993). 
 131 FED. R. CIV. P. 49. 
 132 Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation ProcessThe Case 
for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 50 (1990). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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inconsistent with a general verdict, the trial court judge has the duty to 
reconcile them, if possible.135 If the jury’s factual findings do not enable the 
court to reach a general verdict, the judge has discretion to submit additional 
questions to the jury, to make independent factual findings on unresolved 
issues, or to order a new trial if any factual inconsistencies cannot be 
remedied.136 Special verdicts have seen increasing use in recent years,137 and 
several states encourage or even mandate the use of special verdicts in certain 
instances.138 
Special interrogatories represent a compromise position between the 
general verdict and the special verdict.139 The jury issues a general verdict 
but is also asked to answer accompanying factual questions not unlike those 
used for a special verdict.140 When the answers to the special interrogatories 
are consistent with the jury’s general verdict, the court is obligated to enter 
judgment on the verdict.141 When the answers to the special interrogatories 
are internally consistent, but inconsistent with the verdict, then the court may 
enter judgment consistent with the interrogatories and opposed to the verdict, 
return the verdict and interrogatories to the jury for further consideration, or 
order a new trial.142 Finally, when the answers to the interrogatories are both 
internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the verdict, the court must 
submit the verdict and interrogatories to the jury for further consideration or 
order a new trial.143 
Special verdicts and special interrogatories present both potential 
benefits and drawbacks. Opponents argue that these mechanisms might 
increase the frequency of hung juries144 and might involve so many questions 
as to make the jury’s deliberations unmanageable.145 More significantly, 
many commentators, including the late Justices William Douglas and Hugo 
Black, have suggested that special verdicts and interrogatories impair the 
 
 135 Fang, supra note 35, at 29697. 
 136 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3)(4). 
 137 Brodin, supra note 132, at 21. 
 138 David A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making?, 
36 JURIMETRICS J. 275, 276–77 (1996). California, Iowa, Idaho, Michigan, and Texas are among the 
states that sometimes require the use of special verdicts. See id. at 277 n.7 (identifying special-verdict 
requirements in various states). 
 139 Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 
14 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1, 5 (1990). 
 140 Id. at 2. 
 141 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(2). 
 142 Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 139, at 5. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Brodin, supra note 132, at 61. 
 145 Id. at 79. 
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right to trial by jury by denying the jury the unfettered right to produce a 
general verdict.146 Proponents argue that these mechanisms improve 
deliberations by focusing the jurors’ attention on discrete, manageable 
issues,147 assisting the jurors in sifting through large amounts of 
information,148 and encouraging the jurors to remain objective in reaching 
decisions.149 Likewise, proponents argue that special verdicts and 
interrogatories assist the appellate court by disclosing additional information 
about the decision-making process in the lower court,150 which tends to limit 
the number of relitigated issues following a successful appeal.151 
Some authorities suggest that special verdicts and interrogatories favor 
defendants.152 This is because, assuming the evidence equally favors both 
parties, the probability of prevailing on three discrete elements of a claim is 
lower than the probability of prevailing on the claim as a whole.153 In other 
words, if the jury only considers whether the plaintiff has satisfied the entire 
claim, as in a general verdict, then the plaintiff should prevail 50% of the 
time.154 If the jury instead assesses whether the plaintiff has proved each of 
three consecutive elements, the odds drop to 12.5% (0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5).155 On 
the other hand, in certain circumstances, the special verdict might skew in 
favor of the plaintiff, such as when alternative legal theories for the same 
claim would allow the plaintiff “two bites at the apple.”156 
Professors Elizabeth Wiggins and Steven Breckler conducted an 
empirical analysis of the effects of special verdicts on verdict outcomes and 
juror comprehension of instructions.157 The study subjects were ninety-six 
students at a large state university who viewed a videotaped mock trial.158 
 
 146 REPORT OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-48, at 20 (1963); see also Brodin, supra note 132, at 40 (discussing 
the opposition statement of Justices Black and Douglas).  
 147 Brodin, supra note 132, at 58. 
 148 Id. at 65. 
 149 Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 139, at 2. 
 150 Brodin, supra note 132, at 68. 
 151 Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 139, at 3–4. 
 152 Id. at 7. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 8. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 9. For example, consider a plaintiff bringing two claims involving the same factual 
transaction that are based on different legal theories, such as a contract suit where a buyer sues for breach 
of contract and breach of warranty. A special verdict form that emphasizes both breach of contract and 
breach of warranty may be biased against the defendant. Id. 
 157 Id. at 10–14. 
 158 Id. at 1011. 
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After viewing the mock trial, the study subjects were asked to issue two 
verdicts using some combination of general and special verdict forms.159 
Ultimately, the researchers concluded that the verdict form did not affect the 
trial outcome, although study subjects allocated compensatory and punitive 
damages differently depending on which form was used.160 After issuing 
their verdicts, the subjects’ comprehension was assessed in two ways. First, 
they were given a list of legal issues presented by the trial (e.g., “whether the 
defendant made a defamatory statement”) and asked to assign the burden of 
proof for that issue to the correct party.161 Second, the subjects were given a 
set of factual findings from a mock jury’s special verdict and were asked to 
determine whether those factual findings warranted a verdict for the plaintiff 
or for the defendant.162 The researchers found that special verdicts improved 
comprehension to a limited extent.163 Specifically, the study subjects who 
issued special verdicts were more successful in assigning the correct burden 
of proof on the first comprehension measure than those who issued general 
verdicts.164 However, they were no more successful in selecting the correct 
verdict in response to the mock jury’s factual findings.165 Furthermore, the 
performance levels in both the special-verdict and general-verdict conditions 
were low overall.166 
4. Preliminary/Interim Instructions 
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial judges the 
discretion to provide preliminary instructions for any trial.167 Proponents 
suggest that preliminary instructions might improve juror recall of evidence 
and instructions;168 help jurors overcome bias towards the parties;169 reduce 
juror confusion;170 encourage jurors to withhold judgment until the end of 
trial;171 and increase jurors’ abilities to connect evidence to relevant legal 
issues.172 In contrast, critics suggest that preliminary instructions could be 
 
 159 Id. at 11–12. 
 160 Id. at 30. 
 161 Id. at 17. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 31. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
 168 Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 629; Sand & Reiss, supra note 123, at 438. 
 169 Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 629; Sand & Reiss, supra note 123, at 438. 
 170 Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 629. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Sand & Reiss, supra note 123, at 438. 
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redundant; slow down the progress of trials; push jurors to adopt a 
hypothesis-confirming mindset with biasing effects against the defendant; 
and encourage jurors to determine a preliminary verdict before all evidence 
has been introduced.173 
Available research provides a mixed picture of preliminary instructions. 
Studies are inconclusive as to whether preliminary instructions improve juror 
recall of evidence or instructions.174 A 1985 Second Circuit study assessed 
judge and attorney reactions to preliminary instructions in ten civil and four 
criminal trials.175 The three participating judges were encouraged to give 
preliminary instructions that would provide “maximum guidance” to the 
jurors.176 Following the trial, the participating judges and counsel on both 
sides completed questionnaires on their reactions to the preliminary 
instructions.177 The majority of participants reported satisfaction with the use 
of preliminary instructions, with some reporting improved juror 
attentiveness, and none reporting any delay in the trial as a result of the 
preliminary instructions.178 
One 1993 study found significant differences in evidence recall and 
accuracy of compensation awards, but not in overall verdict accuracy, 
between mock jurors who received preliminary instructions and those who 
did not.179 After listening to a two-hour audiotape of a mock toxic tort trial 
involving multiple plaintiffs,180 study participants were assessed on several 
measures. First, participants were asked to retell the events of the case; their 
comments were recorded and then categorized as probative, nonprobative, 
or evaluative.181 Second, participants were given a list of factual assertions, 
some of which came from the trial and some of which were plausible “lures,” 
and were asked to identify which items were actually part of the trial.182 
Finally, participants were asked to reach a liability decision and to determine 
 
 173 Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 629. 
 174 Lynne ForsterLee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Martin J. Bourgeois, Juror Competence in Civil Trials: 
Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 14, 14–15 (1993). 
 175 Sand & Reiss, supra note 123, at 437. 
 176 Id. at 437–38. 
 177 Id. at 439–40. 
 178 Id. at 439–41. 
 179 ForsterLee et al., supra note 174, at 18–19. 
 180 Id. at 16. 
 181 Id. at 17. 
 182 Id. Probative statements were defined as those directly drawn from the evidence, nonprobative 
statements as those that were not related to the case or evidence, and evaluative statements as those which 
reflected an opinion on—but not a specific event recalled from—the evidence. Id. 
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compensation for the plaintiff if the participant found the defendant liable.183 
Verdicts did not differ significantly between preinstructed and non-
preinstructed participants, but this was likely because the evidence for the 
mock trial skewed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs.184 On other measures, the 
researchers found significant differences between participants who received 
preliminary instructions and those who did not. The preinstructed 
participants made more probative and fewer nonprobative or evaluative 
statements on the recall test.185 Likewise, they correctly identified a greater 
number of facts from the trial on the recognition measure and avoided more 
of the lures.186 Finally, the preinstructed participants tailored compensatory 
awards more appropriately to the level of injury incurred by different 
plaintiffs in the mock trial.187 
A 1985 study found that preliminary instructions assisted jurors in 
correctly applying the law but did not facilitate greater recall of the evidence. 
The study examined judge, attorney, and juror reactions to the use of 
preliminary instructions in Wisconsin trials.188 Twenty-nine judges 
participated, and they were asked to give preliminary instructions on issues 
such as the burden of proof, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and 
various procedural matters.189 Additionally, the judges were encouraged to 
provide any additional substantive instructions that they felt would be helpful 
for the jurors.190 Following the trial, judges, attorneys, and jurors were asked 
to mail in a questionnaire reflecting on their experiences with the preliminary 
instructions.191 The juror questionnaire also included a number of questions 
testing recall and comprehension of the judges’ instructions.192 The 
researchers concluded that, although jurors felt that the preliminary 
instructions were helpful to their understanding and application of the law, 
the preliminary instructions did not improve recall of the evidence or the 
instructions.193 However, the judges’ questionnaires expressed greater 
agreement with the verdicts issued by juries who received preliminary 
 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 19. 
 185 Id. at 19–20 
 186 Id. at 19. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and 
Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 41617 (1989). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 417. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 424–25. 
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instructions, which, combined with the jurors’ subjective assessments, 
suggests that preliminary instructions did in fact aid jurors in applying the 
law correctly.194 
5. Bifurcation 
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits courts to 
conduct separate trial phases for different issues and claims, a process known 
as bifurcation.195 Courts can implement bifurcation at any time “[f]or 
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize” the trial, so 
long as the federal right to a jury trial is preserved.196 Proponents suggest that 
bifurcation benefits litigants by ensuring the logical, sequential presentation 
of the evidence, thereby allowing jurors to more easily concentrate on 
relevant information and improving the quality of deliberations.197 
Proponents also suggest that bifurcation may shorten overall trial time by, 
for example, obviating the need to conduct a trial for damages in the absence 
of a finding of liability.198 Finally, they argue that bifurcation, by dividing a 
trial into more manageable pieces, should promote jurors’ comprehension of 
the evidence and legal issues.199 
Several empirical studies shed light on the effects of bifurcation on jury 
decision-making. A 1963 study reviewed verdicts in 186 personal injury 
cases in the Northern District of Illinois, some of which were bifurcated.200 
The researchers found that the bifurcated proceedings skewed heavily in 
favor of the defendants—defendants prevailed in 34% of the unitary or 
“regular” trials but in 56% of bifurcated trials.201 Moreover, the researchers 
noticed notable time savings with bifurcated trials. Whereas 78% of unitary 
proceedings completed the full trial stage, only 15% of bifurcated 
proceedings did.202 Furthermore, the average trial length dropped from 4.2 
 
 194 Id. at 425–26. It bears mentioning, however, that the self-reporting nature of the questionnaires 
somewhat weakens the strength of these conclusions. 
 195 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 767–68 (1991). 
 198 Id. at 768. 
 199 Stephan Landsman, Shari Diamond, Linda Dimitropoulos & Michael J. Saks, Proposed Reforms 
and Their Effects: Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 333–34. 
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L. REV. 1606, 1610 (1963). 
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days in unitary proceedings to 3.1 days in bifurcated proceedings.203 
However, the researchers tempered their findings by noting that the 
participating judges had selected which trials to bifurcate, thus leaving open 
the possibility that the bifurcated trials were somehow substantively different 
from the unitary ones.204 
Another study published in 1990 tested mock jurors with a simulated 
toxic tort case.205 Much like the 1985 Wisconsin preliminary instructions 
study, this study found that the defendant prevailed significantly more often 
in bifurcated, rather than unitary, trials.206 Specifically, the plaintiff prevailed 
in 87.5% of unitary trials but in only 25% of bifurcated trials.207 However, 
when the plaintiff prevailed in a bifurcated trial, the compensatory damages 
awards were significantly larger than in a unitary trial.208 
A third study published by Professor Stephan Landsman in 1998 
reaffirmed many of the earlier findings. This study tested mock juror verdicts 
using a videotaped, simulated asbestos lawsuit.209 The video simulation was 
bifurcated into proceedings on compensatory damages and liability and then 
separate proceedings on punitive damages and liability.210 Half of the study’s 
participants viewed the video in a unitary fashion and the remaining half 
began with compensatory damages and then considered punitive damages 
only if they found liability for compensatory damages.211 As with the two 
earlier studies, the researchers found that the defendant prevailed more 
frequently in the bifurcated proceeding—in this case, the jury found the 
defendant liable only 42.8% of the time in bifurcated proceedings versus 
55.2% of the time in unitary proceedings.212 On the other hand, they also 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 1611–12. 
 205 Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues 
in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 270 (1990). 
 206 Id. at 282. 
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condition to use evidence from the simpler issue of damages to dispel their uncertainty about the more 
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 208 Id. at 283. 
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 210 Id. at 308–09. 
 211 Id. at 31112. 
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found less variance in compensatory damage awards when using a bifurcated 
proceeding, regardless of the strength of the evidence on that issue.213 One 
noteworthy result: the study found no evidence that bifurcation significantly 
improved juror comprehension.214 
III. APPLYING EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
DELIBERATIONS 
As Part I of this Note shows, jurors continue to struggle with 
comprehending and applying legal instructions during the course of a trial, 
and these struggles can result in significant consequences. Likewise, as 
discussed in Part II, although existing trial mechanisms such as juror note-
taking and preliminary instruction do assist jurors in comprehending 
instructions, there remains significant room for improvement. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that jurors would struggle to apply legal 
instructions during the course of a trial. Jurors, as laypersons, are given 
tremendous responsibility upon entering the courtroom—they are asked to 
quickly internalize abstract legal principles and accurately apply them to 
make powerful decisions about the lives of others.215 As Professor Diamond 
notes, jurors are asked to do in mere days what law students struggle to do 
over the course of years.216 In the process, they are “doused with a kettleful 
of law . . . that would make a third-year law student blanch.”217 
This Part suggests that to assist jurors in correctly applying the law, it 
would be wise to view jurors as learners and to tailor courtroom procedures 
to reflect this perspective. First, it addresses the basis for viewing jurors as 
similar to students in traditional classroom environments. Next, it explores 
the contours of one prominent educational theory, known as “direct” or 
“systematic” instruction. It briefly reviews the history of Direct Instruction 
and argues for the particular usefulness of this theory in the context of jury 
instructions. It then overviews the key principles of Direct Instruction. Next, 
it translates these principles into the legal context to suggest novel 
instructional and deliberation procedures that are both educationally sound 
and compatible with existing trial mechanisms. This Note concludes by 
addressing potential challenges to the proposed procedures and by 
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suggesting testing mechanisms to establish the viability of the proposal prior 
to implementation in live courtroom proceedings. 
A. Jurors as Learners 
This Note is not the first piece of scholarship to describe jurors as 
learners. One scholar explains that while jurors naturally resemble the 
general population, they also bear strong resemblances to students in 
traditional lecture-based classrooms.218 They are asked to internalize new 
concepts that are carefully packaged by the judge and attorneys—the 
courtroom’s “teachers.”219 Although jurors should be viewed as adult 
learners, they are, owing to their lack of familiarity with legal proceedings, 
unusually dependent upon the court and counsel.220 And while jurors are 
motivated to understand the trial and reach a correct verdict, the parties’ trial 
presentations often fail to assist jurors in meeting this responsibility.221 
Moreover, other scholars argue that lawyers should view themselves as 
“educator-advocates” who have a duty to present information to jurors in a 
comprehensible manner.222 An attorney operating under this premise would 
more carefully mirror the behavior of teachers insofar as attorneys “plan and 
evaluate the way they present information” like effective teachers in order to 
craft the most convincing story for their audiences.223 Indeed, at least one 
scholar has explicitly called for incorporating principles of educational 
psychology into courtroom procedures.224 This seems a sensible approach, 
given that every “trial is an exercise in education.”225 
B. Lessons from Educational Theory: Direct Instruction 
If we accept as true that jurors are essentially novice legal learners, what 
insights about their learning experiences might we draw from the realm of 
 
 218 Cover, supra note 215, at 292 (“Broadly conceived, the juror experience looks very much like a 
classroom learning experience.”). This article makes an excellent case for understanding jurors as adult 
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 223 Cover, supra note 215, at 299. 
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115:1185 (2021) Laypeople as Learners 
1213 
educational theory? One especially relevant theory is that of “systematic” or 
“direct” instruction. Direct Instruction was developed in the 1960s by 
Siegfried Engelmann226 as a way of teaching foundational skills in math and 
reading.227 Engelmann had noticed that disadvantaged students struggled to 
acquire reading skills because of a relative deficit in preexisting language 
skills when compared to their more affluent peers.228 Direct Instruction was 
designed to remedy this deficit by helping these at-risk students efficiently 
master basic skills so they could tackle more complex areas of study on a 
“level playing field” with their peers.229 
Direct Instruction techniques were initially developed through 
correlational studies in which researchers identified educators who produced 
unusually large gains in student achievement and then analyzed those 
educators’ classroom procedures to detect common instructional 
strategies.230 The researchers then compiled these strategies into a manual for 
teaching, which was used as the foundation for experimental studies that 
tested whether intentional implementation of the strategies would improve 
students’ academic performance.231 Though the experimental studies were 
primarily conducted in math and reading classrooms, they revealed that, on 
balance, students taught using Direct Instruction obtained significantly 
higher posttest scores than students taught in the control setting.232 
Key tenets of Direct Instruction include checking frequently for 
understanding, presenting material in small steps, and allowing students the 
opportunity to actively and successfully participate in the learning process.233 
In terms of instructional design, Direct Instruction counsels that educators 
should break material into small steps to prevent unnecessary confusion, 
structure learning by providing an overview or outline of new material, and 
 
 226 Siegfried Engelmann, Wesley C. Becker, Douglas Carnine & Russell Gersten, The Direct 
Instruction Follow Through Model: Designs and Outcomes, 11 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 303, 303 
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give ample opportunities to learners to practice applying new concepts, along 
with many opportunities for feedback.234 
Several theoretical considerations underpin this approach. First, 
learners have limited working memory, and, when exposed to new 
information, can experience “cognitive overload” that inhibits the processing 
of new material.235 Furthermore, absent opportunities to “elaborate on, 
review, and rehearse,” new material is unlikely to transition from working 
memory to long-term memory, where it can be actively used.236 Second, 
learners cannot process underlying patterns adequately to solve complex 
problems without developing “well-connected and elaborate knowledge 
structures” in long-term memory.237 Lastly, understanding is enhanced when 
learners are given the chance to “explain, elaborate, or defend” their 
positions.238 
When viewed through the lenses of origins, purpose, and theoretical 
underpinnings, Direct Instruction principles appear uniquely suited to assist 
jurors in carrying out their duties. Jurors are, in every sense, the 
disadvantaged students in the courtroom: they come in with little or no 
formal experience with the legal system and almost certainly no concept of 
such fuzzy terms as “reasonableness” and “comparative negligence.” And 
they are asked to apply a “kettleful of law”239 without the benefit—enjoyed 
by the judge and attorneys, this classroom’s “more affluent peers”240—of 
years of legal experience. Of all the parties in a courtroom, jurors enter with 
the hardest job and yet the fewest basic skills with which to undertake it. So, 
Direct Instruction, which was designed to help even the most disadvantaged 
students efficiently achieve success, seems tailor-made to help jurors out of 
the quandary they face. 
True, Direct Instruction techniques have not been researched with 
respect to legal education. But countless studies over the last fifty years have 
established that Direct Instruction techniques promote student learning in 
wide-ranging subjects such as math, reading, the sciences, foreign languages, 
and other complex cognitive skills.241 And at least one authority suggests that 
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Direct Instruction should be useful in any “well-structured”242 content area. 
“Well-structured” is undefined, but when viewing the subjects covered, the 
common threads are apparent. Math, language, reading, the sciences—each 
of these disciplines contains a well-developed body of knowledge founded, 
in large part, upon predictable, structured systems and rules. What could be 
more structured than the legal profession? The entire common law system is 
predicated on the idea that similar cases should produce similar results,243 
and the very existence of projects like the Restatements of Law, which seek 
to articulate the underlying principles of common law,244 speak to the “well-
structured” nature of the legal system. Thus, Direct Instruction techniques 
should prove just as helpful in the courtroom as they have in the classroom. 
Accordingly, taking as true that jurors can be viewed as novice legal learners, 
and that Direct Instruction significantly promotes learning in “well-
structured” subjects, such as law, how might Direct Instruction principles 
inform courtroom procedures? The next Section addresses that question. 
C. Recommended Procedures 
In view of jurors’ status as novice legal learners, and with the Direct 
Instruction principles discussed above kept firmly in mind, this Note 
recommends the following procedures to assist juror comprehension and 
deliberations. First, jurors should receive preliminary instructions in every 
trial. The preliminary instructions should cover both procedural and 
substantive matters, including instructions on each and every element of the 
plaintiff’s presumptive claims against the defendant.245 As discussed in Part 
II, preliminary instructions should help improve juror comprehension by 
giving jurors a mental schema through which to analyze the evidence 
presented. This reform is also entirely consistent with the Direct Instruction 
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principle that learners should be provided with an overview or outline when 
engaging with unfamiliar material for the first time.246 
Second, the trial should be conducted in short segments, not unlike the 
bifurcation of issues already commonly used. However, unlike bifurcation, 
the introduction of evidence in this scenario should be limited not to a single, 
large-scale issue, such as liability in a personal injury case, but rather to a 
single element of a claim, such as the intent requirement of battery. Much 
like the bifurcation procedures described in Part II,247 this method would 
allow jurors to benefit from concentrating on discrete, manageable 
components of a legal claim to a greater degree than is allowed by more 
conventional bifurcation procedures. Direct Instruction principles suggest 
that by breaking jury deliberations into smaller steps, jurors might be 
relieved of some of the cognitive overload they might otherwise experience 
when engaging with unfamiliar legal concepts. To further accommodate 
limitations on human working memory, interim instructions should also be 
provided at the beginning of each trial segment, in both written and oral 
form, regarding the relevant element of the claim (e.g., intent in a battery 
claim).248 This should assist jurors in moving the relevant legal concepts out 
of working memory and into long-term memory, where they might more 
easily be applied to reach a correct verdict in the case at hand. 
Third, after all of the evidence on a particular element is introduced, 
jurors should be permitted to deliberate solely on that element. Moreover, in 
keeping with the Direct Instruction principle that learners should have ample 
opportunities for feedback, jurors should be permitted to ask clarifying 
questions of the court at any time during deliberations.249 The judge should 
have considerable latitude to provide clarification in response to these 
questions. In particular, this Note recommends that judges, where needed, 
provide examples of factual scenarios that would or would not satisfy a 
particular element of a claim. Of course, caution is needed to avoid biasing 
the jurors in their efforts to independently reach a correct verdict. Any 
clarifying factual examples should be provided only with the consent of both 
parties and should remain at a relatively high level of abstraction that avoids 
close resemblance to the facts of the case. As a model for these examples, 
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one might consider the examples following each provision of the various 
Restatements of Law.250 These “illustrations” demonstrate how the legal 
principles embodied in the Restatements can be applied to various factual 
contexts and do so in fairly generic, fact-light contexts. Similarly, judge-
provided examples could be a useful scaffold251 to assist jurors during 
deliberations. 
If, while deliberating on any particular element of the claim, the jury 
should happen to find that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of 
persuasion on that element—typically a preponderance of the evidence—
then the jury should return an early verdict for the defendant and conclude 
the trial. Otherwise, the trial should continue on in these shorter segments, 
with jurors receiving only the instructions necessary to deliberate on a single 
element of a claim at the end of each segment. This would improve juror 
comprehension because it will give jurors the opportunity to deliberate on 
narrower, more easily understandable issues from which they can, per 
Professor Barak Rosenshine, “explain, elaborate, or defend”252 their positions 
to their fellow jurors. Combined with the freely available clarification from 
the court, this deliberation structure would bring jurors closer to the “guided 
practice”253 that Direct Instruction principles suggest would assist jurors in 
learning to apply the law. 
 
 250 By way of example, § 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines battery as follows: 
 An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
 (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other 
 or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and  
 (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 14 of the same Restatement further 
provides: “To make the actor liable for a battery, the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act 
done by the person whose liability is in question.” Id. § 14. The comments then illustrate this concept: “A 
pushes B against C, knocking C down and breaking his leg. A, and not B, is subject to liability to C.” Id. 
§ 14 cmt. b, illus. 1. 
 251 Scaffolding, in the educational context, refers to a “process that enables a . . . novice to solve a 
problem, carry out a task or achieve a goal which would be beyond [the novice’s] unassisted efforts.” 
Janet Mannheimer Zydney, Scaffolding, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SCIENCES OF LEARNING 2913 
(Norbert M. Seel ed., 2012) (quoting David Wood, Jerome S. Bruner & Gail Ross, The Role of Tutoring 
in Problem Solving, 17 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 89, 90 (1976)). The concept is derived from Lev 
Vygotsky’s theory of the zone of proximal development, which posits that a learner develops most rapidly 
when undertaking tasks that cannot be completed alone, but which are achievable with support and 
guidance from others. Id. at 2914 (referencing Lev S. Vygotsky, Interaction Between Learning and 
Development, in READINGS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 34 (Mary Gauvain & Michael Cole 
eds., 4th ed. 2005)). The “scaffolding” moniker for this concept was first coined by David Wood in 1976. 
Id. 
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Of course, should a trial continue through its full course without an 
early verdict for the defendant, jurors should simply receive one final, 
complete set of jury instructions following the introduction of all evidence. 
At this point, jurors would simply deliberate and return a general verdict in 
the traditional fashion. 
1. Compatibility with Existing Trial Mechanisms 
Although these procedures are novel, they comport with existing trial 
mechanisms. Preliminary instructions are, as stated above, permitted by Rule 
51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.254 Thus, the introduction of 
preliminary and interim instructions throughout the trial should not be 
especially controversial. Likewise, as explained in Part II, written 
instructions are permitted in all United States jurisdictions and seem to 
provide some modest benefits for juror comprehension.255 Furthermore, 
although bifurcation is typically applied to separate larger issues, such as 
causation and damages, Rule 42(b) is agnostic as to the level of issue that is 
separated out for consideration.256 The Rule explicitly allows for the 
segmenting of issues into separate trials, so it should be no technical obstacle 
to segmenting the admission of evidence by element during the course of a 
single trial. The element-by-element deliberation also bears substantial 
similarity to the special-verdict and special-interrogatory procedures 
described in Part II.257 And, again, the submission of questions from jurors to 
the court is permissible in many jurisdictions and has been enthusiastically 
endorsed by some scholars.258 
2. Alignment with Educational Theory 
These procedures are not only theoretically viable, but also align with 
research and relevant educational principles. Research with college students 
suggests that an average learner’s attention span is measured in minutes, not 
hours.259 Thus, it is reasonable to think that juror attention spans are equally 
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limited.260 By dividing instructions into segments, this proposal would 
provide jurors with the shorter, more manageable chunks of information that 
they are accustomed to engaging with in day-to-day life.261 Furthermore, 
providing jurors with more manageable amounts of information would help 
alleviate the burdens on long-term memory that are associated with the 
average trial.262 
As explained above, this proposal also matches well with Direct 
Instruction principles, which suggest that in “well-structured”263 areas of 
study teachers can improve student comprehension by providing scaffolds to 
reduce the difficulty of an unfamiliar task.264 This theory suggests that 
because individuals have limited working memory, they will tackle new 
challenges most effectively if they are asked to engage with only a few pieces 
of information at a time.265 Accordingly, teachers should break information 
into small steps to reduce confusion, provide an overview or outline of the 
topic from the outset of new learning, and provide learners with ample 
opportunities to practice with new skills.266 This proposal satisfies all of these 
steps. Preliminary instructions provide an outline for the relevant legal 
claims. Then, segmenting instructions and deliberations into smaller chunks 
accommodates limits on jurors’ working memory, and short, frequent 
periods of deliberation with the opportunity to ask questions provide jurors 
with a sort of “guided practice” as they strive to correctly learn and apply the 
law. Thus, this proposal would greatly assist jurors in comprehending and 
accurately applying unfamiliar legal principles during the course of a trial. 
3. Potential Challenges 
There are several clear arguments against this proposal. The first and 
most significant is that organizing jury instructions and deliberations in this 
manner might raise constitutional concerns. Professor Ronald Eades, among 
others, suggests that special verdicts and similar piece-by-piece deliberations 
infringe upon the ability of juries to “do justice” by eliminating the right to 
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nullify.267 And it is at least arguable that, in a criminal context, jurors should 
be able to nullify—an ability that might be impaired by the step-by-step 
deliberations suggested by this proposal.268 But the constitutional argument 
is exactly that—just one argument in a still-unsettled debate.269 Vigorous 
disagreement continues as to whether jury nullification should ever be 
allowed,270 and the Supreme Court itself has described jury nullification as a 
power of the jury, but one not rightfully wielded.271 But even if one concludes 
that jury nullification must be left intact for criminal trials, this proposal can 
be limited solely to civil trials, a context in which courts uniformly reject any 
right for the jury to issue a verdict contrary to the evidence.272 Indeed, the 
judge in a civil trial can overrule a jury verdict that is clearly not in accord 
with the evidence.273 Accordingly, there should be no significant harm from 
this proposal, which merely asks that jurors consider the evidence in a 
logical, stepwise fashion. 
Second, some may argue that this proposal would skew trial outcomes 
in one direction or another. To some extent, this concern is borne out in the 
research discussed in Part II, which indicates that bifurcated trials can result 
 
 267 Ronald W. Eades, The Problem of Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1017, 
1024–25 (1997) (“The greatest benefit of the special interrogatory may be one of its faults. By eliminating 
the jury’s ability to render a general verdict, the interrogatory prevents the jury from ‘doing justice.’”). 
Many who adopt this position describe the jury as the “conscience of the community” and argue that the 
jury must be empowered to nullify in order to mitigate the sometimes-harsh effects of mechanically 
applying criminal laws. See, e.g., Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a 
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 111, 115 (1980) (“The jury, with its power of nullification, 
is a deliberate attempt to increase citizen participation in government, ameliorate the rigors of laws that 
may be too harsh when applied in certain cases, prevent governmental tyranny, bring the law and the 
community in closer harmony, and allow the people to make the final decision on moral blameworthiness 
in criminal cases.”). 
 268 See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (“There is no easier way to 
reach, and perhaps to force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror, wishing to acquit, 
may be formally catechized. By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer 
unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he 
would have resisted.”). 
 269 For an especially thorough treatment of why jury nullification should not be permitted, see Steven 
M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 191 (1996). 
 270 It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the wide-ranging arguments surrounding the topic 
of jury nullification. For an excellent bibliography identifying the major scholarly writings on both sides 
of the jury nullification debate, the curious reader can consult Teresa L. Conaway, Carol L. Mutz & Joann 
M. Ross, Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 393 (2004). 
 271 “[I]t is [the jury’s] duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal questions . . . . 
They have the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded as rightful . . . .” 
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 83 (1895) (quoting Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588, 592 (1863)). 
 272 Eades, supra note 267, at 1030. 
 273 This refers to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
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in greater numbers of pro-defendant verdicts.274 But there are two responses 
to this. First, it is possible that the verdicts reached in bifurcated trials are in 
fact fairer insofar as jurors cannot as easily “fuse” evidence from different 
phases of the trial, such as evidence on liability and damages.275 As Professor 
Diamond’s study with the Arizona Jury Project suggests, jurors are at times 
inclined to bypass essential elements of a claim, such as negligence, in their 
haste to recompense a clearly injured plaintiff.276 Second, the existing 
research also shows that plaintiffs who manage to prevail in a bifurcated trial 
generally receive larger verdicts.277 True, this might suggest that jurors in 
bifurcated trials hold back on finding liability except in the most egregious 
of cases. But a different, equally plausible framing is that juries in bifurcated 
trials are empowered to more rationally consider the case without allowing 
their sympathy for the plaintiff’s injuries to cloud their view of whether the 
defendant caused those injuries. Absent more definitive research on this 
phenomenon, it may well be that bifurcated trials merely produce different, 
rather than less fair, verdicts. 
 Finally, one might imagine that this Note’s proposed procedures would 
slow down the course of a trial. However, the existing research on bifurcation 
suggests the opposite—bifurcated trials typically take less time, not more.278 
Although trials that run their full course could take longer using the proposed 
procedures, many others could be concluded earlier if the jury quickly finds 
that a single dispositive element279 of the claim fails for the plaintiff. 
 Admittedly, some evidence pertinent to multiple elements of a claim 
might need to be introduced to jurors repeatedly. For instance, in our 
hypothetical products liability case,280 jurors might be introduced to 
 
 274 See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text. 
 275 See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity 
on Mock Jurors’ Liability Judgements, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1477, 1485 (1998) (finding that greater 
plaintiff injuries led to more frequent findings of liability when testing mock jurors). In other words, it 
appears that when faced with a severely injured plaintiff, jurors are more inclined to find someone (read: 
the defendant) liable, even absent strong evidence of causation. 
 276 See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
 277 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 278 See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 200, at 1624 (finding that trial bifurcation saves an average of 
20% of the time that the trial would take using nonbifurcated proceedings). 
 279 To be clear, this Note does not propose holding separate trials as to each element of a claim. 
Rather, it proposes that jurors be allowed to recess intermittently during the course of a single trial to 
deliberate on specific elements of a claim. Bifurcation traditionally results in separate trials, albeit often 
with the same jury. For instance, in a mass tort case, the first trial might address liability, and the second, 
if needed, might address damages. This Note’s proposal speaks to subtrial units of analysis; jurors might, 
for example, be allowed time to deliberate solely on the issue of proximate cause while sitting for a trial 
on the larger issue of liability. 
 280 See supra Introduction. 
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incriminating emails from the defendant twice—once to establish that the 
defendant knew how dangerous their vaping products were, and again to 
establish that the defendant misrepresented that danger to the consuming 
public. At first blush, this might seem a magnificent waste of time. But the 
news wouldn’t be all bad. This is because repetition facilitates evidence 
recall via “overlearning.”281 Thus, any repetition caused by the proposed 
procedures would aid jurors during deliberations by facilitating easier recall 
of the most sensitive evidence—namely, the evidence bearing on multiple 
elements of a claim. And, of course, budget-conscious litigants will continue 
pushing their attorneys to operate efficiently. Accordingly, structuring 
deliberations around discrete elements of a claim might encourage the 
parties’ attorneys to more concisely tie their presentations directly to the 
elements of the claim or even to stipulate to the existence of any undisputed 
elements of the claim. 
 Admittedly, there is some risk that allowing jurors to return an early 
verdict would incentivize them to find against the plaintiff early in the trial 
in order to avoid further jury duty. Trial simulations with mock jurors might 
better establish whether this concern has any basis in reality. As noted above, 
existing research suggests that jurors try hard to fulfill their duties, 282 so this 
concern may only be theoretical. 
4. Establishing Viability 
This proposal fuses aspects of existing trial mechanisms with principles 
drawn from the Direct Instruction educational theory in an effort to create 
trial procedures which will further assist jurors in comprehending and 
applying legal instructions. However, before this proposal can be attempted, 
it would be wise to attempt trial simulations using mock jurors to assess the 
procedure’s impact on juror comprehension. 
A key consideration in structuring such a study is selecting appropriate 
comprehension measures. Earlier studies have sometimes used paraphrasing 
tests, which are obviously more challenging on average than the basic recall 
involved in a multiple-choice assessment. Thus, paraphrasing tests could 
result in underestimating juror comprehension. On the other hand, it is 
conceivable that multiple choice or recall assessments might overestimate 
juror comprehension because the cognitive effort needed for these tasks 
might be less than is required to accurately apply the legal principles 
reflected in the jury instructions. It might be best to emulate Professor 
 
 281 Jaquish & Ware, supra note 222, at 1727 (“Over-learning is essentially the result of repetition 
during the learning process . . . . [R]epetition of key evidence in a case . . . facilitates jury recall of the 
evidence when the problem-solving situation arrives during jury deliberations.”). 
 282 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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Diamond’s approach with the Arizona Jury Project by recording mock juror 
deliberations and assessing how well the participants’ commentary reflects 
the instructions provided. If preliminary studies suggest increased juror 
comprehension, it would then be prudent to undertake more extensive trial 
simulations in order to assess the effect of this procedure on trial length. At 
that point, it might be feasible to attempt this proposal with live juries. 
CONCLUSION 
 Let’s revisit our hypothetical products liability case from the beginning 
of this Note.283 There, the defendants—the ones producing dangerous vaping 
products—escaped liability because the jury erroneously applied a 
contributory negligence defense that was simply inapplicable in that 
jurisdiction. Let’s call this version of reality “World 1.” What would have 
happened in an alternate reality where the trial had been restructured to 
accommodate the Direct Instruction principles described above? We can call 
this reality “World 2.” 
 First, the jurors might be a little less perplexed right out of the gate. At 
the start of the trial, they receive an overview from the judge of the relevant 
legal principles—in this case, the requirements for a strict product liability 
claim based on the defendant’s intentional misrepresentation of the dangers 
inherent in its vaping products. From the beginning, the jurors know that the 
plaintiffs’ claims require proof (1) that the defendant’s vaping products were 
unreasonably dangerous; (2) that the defendant misrepresented that danger; 
(3) that the plaintiffs relied on those misrepresentations; and, of course, (4) 
that they were injured as a result. Undoubtedly, the jurors are already 
benefitting from developing an initial understanding of the relevant legal 
framework, perhaps with the aid of a set of written preliminary instructions 
for their reference. They might even take a few notes on the judge’s 
explanation of particular points of law. 
 As World 2’s version of the case continues, the judge’s decision to 
segment the trial into shorter pieces makes things a little easier for the jury. 
After reviewing, for instance, the requirement that the vaping products must 
have been unreasonably dangerous, the jurors know to focus their attention 
solely on this narrow factual issue. They can concentrate closely on both 
parties’ presentations to see whether this requirement has actually been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. And before engaging with an 
overwhelming amount of new evidence, the jurors have the chance to recess 
together to discuss this element of the claim. They can share their views on 
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the relative strength of each side’s presentation, and they have the 
opportunity to reconcile any differing views of the evidence. 
 In later segments of the trial, the jurors start to notice some repetition. 
For instance, they see that, in repeatedly focusing on some of the defendant’s 
unsavory internal emails, the plaintiffs are establishing both the 
dangerousness of the vaping products as well as the defendant’s decision to 
downplay that danger. The jurors zero in on this information, and it comes 
up repeatedly during their separate discussions of both the “unreasonable 
dangerousness” and “misrepresentation” elements of the claim. 
 At one point, well into the trial, the jurors begin deliberating on the 
reliance element of the plaintiffs’ claims. At first, they struggle—several 
jurors are confused as to how a seemingly individual question of reliance is 
going to be proven on a class-wide basis. Unable to settle the issue alone, the 
jurors submit a question to the judge, who, having first shared the question 
with both parties’ counsel, clarifies that this jurisdiction permits an inference 
of reliance without requiring proof on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis. 
 Eventually, all of the presentations are complete, and the jurors are 
prepared to deliberate. They receive final instructions from the judge, largely 
nodding along as they recognize the now-familiar legal principles involved. 
The jurors retreat to the deliberation room as the litigants nervously wait. 
 The final deliberations aren’t easy. The jurors come into the room with 
different backgrounds and experiences, and not all of them have the same 
view of the evidence. But what they share is a common understanding of the 
legal rules they are being asked to apply; there is no contention over those. 
In that sense, their legal education for this trial has been a success. 
 One thing that never occurs to them? Contributory negligence. All of 
the defendant’s affirmative defenses had been presented earlier, during a 
separate segment of the trial. The jurors know that the plaintiffs’ individual 
decisions to use vaping products, even while aware of some possible 
dangers, simply have no bearing on this lawsuit. In fact, when they discussed 
defenses the first time, they decided to submit a question to the judge on this 
very issue. In short order, they received clarification that contributory 
negligence does not apply in this jurisdiction. 
 The case remains a nail-biter to the end. Still, having thoughtfully 
deliberated on the case, the jurors eventually return a verdict: the defendant 
is liable. The class of injured plaintiffs will be made whole. 
 World 2’s ending is certainly different from World 1’s and is of course 
a much happier ending for the plaintiffs. But it is also a better ending for the 
legal system generally. In this world, the defendants didn’t escape liability 
solely by grace of a sensible but legally incorrect misunderstanding on the 
part of the jurors. And the jurors themselves had a more satisfying 
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experience. They had more support to understand their charge, and they had 
the resources they needed to engage in productive deliberations. Each juror 
felt more secure in their verdict than in World 1, and many were grateful for 
the opportunity to serve. 
 Perhaps World 2 seems a shade utopian. But isn’t it better than the 
status quo? Adopting even some of the proposed procedures could take us 
closer to World 2, even if imperfectly so. And we have every reason to want 
to do so. True, there are promising signs that jurors might comprehend 
instructions to a greater degree than previously thought. But existing 
empirical research still suggests that juror comprehension is lacking. And a 
juror’s struggle to comprehend can result in severe consequences, 
particularly in capital sentencing cases. Existing reforms have somewhat 
mitigated this risk, but they are not a cure-all, and there remains substantial 
room for improvement. By incorporating educational principles into the 
courtroom, some of this dangerous gap in juror comprehension can be filled. 
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